



(WHC)

World Hazara Council

Stalingrad 22 à 1000, Bruxelles, Belgium

Charity number: 0563.369.367

worldhazaracouncil.org

info@worldhazaracouncil.org

worldhazaracouncil@gmail.com

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A Human Rights Situational Analysis of Ethnic-Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan

In the last 130 years, the Hazara ethnic group, having Turkic-Mongolian origins, has faced genocide and forced migration. Their Mongolian facial features and Shiite Muslim faith have been the prime reason for their persecution and genocide in Afghanistan and in the region. They are still being targeted in Afghanistan and Pakistan; they are being singled out, kidnapped and held for ransom and/or being simply killed.

Introduction

The Hazaras constitute a distinct ethno-religious group – historically persecuted on both ethnic and religious grounds- that live predominantly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The Hazara population is estimated to be between 8 to 10 million, although no official statistics have been gathered so far [1,6] and estimates from the three countries amount to even 14 million.

For more than a century, the Hazaras have repeatedly experienced human rights violations. They have been massacred several times for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. The largest mass killings of the Hazaras took place during 1890-1900 by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. According to authentic historical documents and books, 62 per cent of the Hazara population was brutally exterminated [1-4]. The Hazaras' lands were dispossessed and the majority of them experienced cultural and racial genocide in one way or another [1-5]. With the support of the government the Hazaras were enslaved and sold as slaves and servants in Afghan markets for almost a century. They were systematically deprived of their fundamental human rights; the right to life, human dignity, the right to freedom of religion and culture, the right to have social relations with other people, the right to an education, and the right to work in government agencies.

Since the defeat of the Hazara uprising in 1891 until the communist government in 1978, the deprivation of Hazaras continued during the subsequent governments. The coup in 1978 paved the way for their relative freedom and political participation but the emergence of the Pashton-Taliban in 1994 was the start of a new era of suppressing Hazaras in Afghanistan, including several massacres against them in the years later.

During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Hazaras were massacred several times and suffered more damage than any other Afghan ethnic group in terms of casualties, and financial and cultural aspects.

In 1998, more than eight thousand Hazaras were massacred systematically in four days in Mazar-e-Sharif [7,8]. Such killings were repeated in various locations of Afghanistan such as Yakawlang, Bamiyan and Kabul [9,10]. Additionally, the Taliban destroyed the ancient Buddha statues of Bamiyan and hundreds of historically important artefacts within Hazarajat, the central region of Afghanistan, where the Hazara community resides [11].

The Hazaras in Post-2001 International Intervention in Afghanistan

After the fall of the Taliban, the Hazaras were amongst the first ethnic groups who surrendered their weapons to the government to support the peace process. Whilst in the south, the population supported and on occasion gave shelter to the Taliban and extremists, the Hazara community has been the main ethnic group which is pro-government and pro-international military forces in the country since 2001. Hazarajat has been peaceful and stable. There have seldom been attacks against the military forces in the region. Moreover, although Afghanistan remains the largest illicit opium producer in the world, Hazarajat has been a poppy-free zone. This is more significant considering the fact that the level of poverty in Hazarajat is much higher than the rest of the country, and that this region has received the smallest portion of development aid from the government and the international community [12]. For instance, in 2009, only 1% of USAID was allocated to Bamiyan province, whereas the south and southeastern regions received over 90% of USAID aid money.

Michael Semple, the 2008 deputy to the Special Representative of the EU in Afghanistan commented about the Hazaras that: *“The Hazaras are producing the most enthusiastic, educated, and forward-looking [people in Afghanistan], who are seizing the opportunities provided by the new situation.”*

Similarly, Dr. Sima Samar, the director of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the winner of multiple human rights awards and twice a Nobel peace prize nominee, noted *“The Hazaras are more adaptable to democracy, because they feel the pain more than others. They feel the discrimination. They really want equality and social justice.”*

In addition, the Hazaras were actively involved in the democratic process to a larger extent in comparison to other ethnic groups; Hazaras’ presence was remarkable in all elections since 2001. For instance, in the Afghan presidential election in 2014, more than 1.5 million Hazaras casted their ballot in the first and the second rounds. This is equivalent to 22% of the total vote in the country [13]. Hazara women have found and enjoyed more freedom compared to other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and are now playing key roles in social, economic and political positions within the country. Afghanistan’s first ever two female governors and first female mayor were Hazara women. In fact, this ethnic group has paid remarkable attention to education and obtaining knowledge, and the avoidance of violence has been institutionalized as one of their main principles.

Despite the fact that in the past 14 years Hazarajat has been quite safe, the roads leading to Hazarajat, and almost all the motorways across the country, are very dangerous and unsafe for Hazaras. The Hazara passengers are clearly identifiable and easily distinguishable due to their Mongol-Turk facial features. Indeed, there are hundreds of cases of violence perpetrated by extremist groups against the Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past ten years.

Kuchi-Hazara Issue

In addition, another key source of vulnerability for Hazaras is the nomad-Kuchi/Hazara dispute, which takes place every summer. The nomad-Kuchis are ethnic Pashtuns. The origin of the dispute dates back to the 1894 edict issued by King Abdur Rahman Khan, which gifted lands throughout

Hazarajat to those Kuchi clans that had assisted him in defeating the rebellious Hazaras [1-3]. As a result, 30,000 to 40,000 responded to Abdur Rahman Khan's call for jihad, most of whom were Kuchis of Ahmadzai and Mohmand tribes [2,3].

According to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), due to the Kuchi attack in Maidan province in 2008, more than 1,900 Hazara families were displaced, 11 people were killed and 15 injured [14,15]. In 2009, approximately 6,000 families were displaced and 24 Hazaras were killed [14]. In the May 2010 attack, 6 Hazaras were killed and 340 villages were totally deserted, as well as 28 schools closed, leaving 10,000 students without schooling facilities [14,15]. In summary, from 2008 to 2010 more than 41 people were killed in the Kuchi attacks, dozens were injured and nearly 10,000 families were forced to flee their villages [14]. However, the Kuchi attacks on Hazarajat have not ended and every spring conflict and tensions arise, leading to violence, destruction and human casualties [17-22].

As Prof. Marley, the Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University and author of a number of books on Afghanistan, concluded, the position of Hazaras as a predominantly Shi'a non-Pashtun minority, makes them an easy target for the overwhelmingly Pashtun Taliban who are seeking to rebuild support from Sunni Pashtun groups such as the Kuchis [23,24]. Indeed, Kuchis still doubt the religious correctness of Hazaras. As a result, the Hazaras always associate the Kuchis with the Taliban [25]. Meanwhile, the Taliban has exploited this opportunity to incite inter-ethnic tensions. As the UNDP 2009 report concluded, the armed conflict has reached a level where it can easily evolve into inter-ethnic conflict that can engage further Taliban exploitation [15].

Hazaras in Post-2014 International Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

With the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan, continued Taliban insurgency, the gradual withdrawal of international forces from the country and lack of effective policies from the current Unity Government of Afghanistan, the security situation in the country has become very critical [26].

The US State department's assessment of the current situation states [27] that *"No province in Afghanistan should be considered immune from violence, and the potential exists throughout the country for hostile acts, either targeted or random, against U.S. and other foreign nationals at any time. Insurgent elements, including the Haqqani Network, Hizb-e Islami, and the Taliban, remain violently opposed to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan."*

An increase in violence and instability will mostly affect vulnerable minority groups and women. The Hazaras in particular, who have suffered the most during the Taliban regime, will be the main victims. Whilst the country is dominated by Sunni Muslims, the vast majority of Hazaras are Shiite Muslims. According to extremist groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS, the Hazara Shias are infidels. Despite some Hazaras being Sunni, and whilst many more have converted due to persecution, these extremist groups do not accept them as Muslims. In light of this, the Hazaras are continuously targeted, kidnapped, killed and used as bargaining political tools for negotiations with the government.

Just in 2015, more than 150 Hazaras, including four women and two children were abducted by terrorist groups like the Taliban and ISIS on the highway across different parts of Afghanistan. These are the incidents that are reported by domestic and international media organizations; however, there are still many unreported incidents across the country. By the end of 2015, 33 of the reported hostages were brutally killed, including two women and a 9-year-old child. Unfortunately, 43 hostages are still missing, including two women and a child. The full details of these incidents can be found in the appendix of this report.

In 2016, many more Hazaras have been kidnapped and killed across the country. Almost all the road across the country are now unsafe for Hazaras to travel and this community is locked in undefined prisons throughout Afghanistan. In September 2016, five students travelling from Kabul to Ghor province, after being identified as Hazaras, were taken away at gun point [53]. One of these students was brutally killed on October 2016 [54]. In October 2016, dozens of Hazara passengers were kidnapped at Maidan Wardak highway, just a few kilometres from Kabul city [55]. In October 2016, Taliban released a video where 15 Hazaras, including few children, were ferociously killed [56]. There are some reports that some Hazara community leaders have recently joined Taliban to protect their community from Taliban itself [57].

With the rise of Islamic State in Afghanistan, this community has been directly under attack by ISIS suicide bombers across the country. In 2016 more than four incidents were plotted against Hazara community in Kabul and Mazars-Sharif in which more than 150 people were killed and hundreds were injured. In particular, we can name the attacks during their peaceful demonstration on 23 July 2016 and their Ashura religious festival on 11 and 12 of October. At these incidents, more than 120 people were killed and hundreds were injured [58,59]. The attack on demonstrators were the deadliest in the capital since 2011[60]. These targeted attacks on Hazaras clearly indicate their increasing vulnerability, even in cities under government control. An ISIS commander called Abu Omar Khorasani has told Reuter News agency that they will continue their attack on Hazara community until the Iranians are involved in Syrian war [61].

In 2017, both Taliban and ISIS continued their terror attacks on Hazara community across the country. On January 6, a group of Hazara miners returning from Tala Wa Barfak district to their home in Daykundi province, were stopped at Pull-e-Sher area while traveling by bus. According to eyewitnesses the attackers by shouting that the Hazara are not Muslim fired at them, killing seven and injuring four [62-64]. On June 15, an attack at Shia mosque (al-Zahra) in Kabul killed four people and wounded eight. The ISIS claimed responsibility for this deadly attack [65, 66]. In addition, on August 25, a gunmen attacked another Shia mosque (Imam Zaman) in Kabul killing and injuring more than 14 Hazaras [67].

On Friday, August 4, 2017 about 800 armed men launched a three pronged attack on Hazara village called Mirza Walang. This village is located in the remote mountainous region of Sar-e-Pul province in north-central Afghanistan. The attack began at midnight by Taliban and ISIS extremists from different provinces. With horrible cruelty men, women and children were gunned down, decapitated or dismembered. They killed more than 50 people, including women and children, according to the officials [68, 69]. The bodies were buried in several mass graves in one of which 35 people were discovered. More than 150 families are trapped and surrounded by the extremists. About 80 people including women are reportedly taken hostage and transported to different regions. In this incident, the central government did not send any reinforcement to the region, despite repeated advance warnings and requests from the local people militia. This happened despite the fact that the Afghan government was fully aware of precarious situation of the Hazaras.

The vulnerability of the Hazaras is best reflected in a statement released, in August 2013, by Gulbuddin Hekmatiyar, the insurgency leader of Hizb-e-Islami, who openly threatened the Hazaras by stating that *“the time will come when the people of Afghanistan will stand for taking their usurped rights and then the [Hazaras] will have no safe haven in any corner of the country to hide... they would pay the price of supporting them”* and by ‘them’ he meant the international coalition. It is worth mentioning that Mr. Hekmatiyar who was considered by the US as an international terrorist leader is now part of a group that is close to president Ghani.

It should be mentioned that this is not the first time that the Hazaras have been threatened for their

support of the international community and their progressive values and subsequently have been gravely punished. As Prof. William Marley cautioned, history shows that every reform which delivered greater equity for Hazaras did not stop the bloodshed that followed after [24].

Hazaras in Pakistan

The Hazaras living in Pakistan are facing even harder circumstances. In Pakistan, the Hazara population (estimated between 0.5 and 0.6 million) is largely concentrated in Quetta city, the provincial capital of the south-western restive and insurgency-riddled province of Baluchistan [43]. The population in Quetta have been living in two separate and distinct areas called Alamdar Road and Hazara Town. The perpetual attacks on the members of the community have compelled the community to live their lives in an ‘open jail’ (Hazara Town stretching to only 4 square km). In the last few years, hundreds of civil servants, students and entrepreneurs from Hazara community have abandoned their jobs, studies and businesses due to security reasons [43, 44]. Their distinguished mongoloid facial features which hve been termed as the “fault in their faces” by a senior officer from Baluchistan, easily distinguish them from the rest of local population and are thus easily targeted [44].

Over the course of the past 15 years, more than 1,500 Hazaras have been killed and over 3,500 wounded in a series of over 200 attacks across Pakistan [44, 46]. These attacks have included assassinations, suicide bombings, rocket shellings, and targeting Hazara public gathering places such as hotels and sports clubs to maximize their fatalities. Most tragically, there are instances where Hazara passengers have been identified on public transport and taken off for mass executions.

The individuals and groups responsible in the systematic killing of the Hazaras are known to the Pakistani state institutions. Indeed, Lashkari Jangavi (LeJ), Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ) and Jaish ul Islam have been claiming responsibility of these attacks on Hazaras. Yet, not a single culprit has been apprehended, charged and brought to justice so far. In many cases, the individuals and groups responsible for massacres have enjoyed government and community protection [47]. Their terrorist activities against the Hazaras still continue un-interrupted, especially in Quetta city, the provincial capital of Balochistan, Pakistan. Since January 2015, 60 Hazaras were killed and more than 40 have been injured in approximately 33 incidents [44].

Recently on September 10, 2017 gunmen opened fire on a Hazara family killing four of them including a 13-year-old boy [70]. In a similar attack on October 9, 2017 gunmen killed five people belonging to the ethnic Hazara minority in southwest Pakistan [71]. According to a Pakistani police officer, more than 20 Hazaras have been killed in similar shootings in Balochistan over the past two years [70].

Hazaras in Iran

A very large number of Hazara refugees currently reside in Iran [28]. Although many Afghans have been living in Iran for decades, they are deprived of basic human rights such as obtaining residency or work permits. Such discrimination exists in Iran although many families are second and third generation refugees [28, 29].

Every year the Iranian government forcefully deports thousands of Afghans. For instance, around 173,000 and 10,086 Afghans were deported in 2012 and 2013, respectively [30]. Many of the deportees complained of torture and other abuses by their employers or the Iranian police [29]. In addition, drug addiction is very common among returnees [31]. The Afghan media claim that around 3,000 Afghan prisoners were on death row, having routinely been denied access to lawyers and forced

to sign confessions [31, 32]. The Iranian government has found an opportunity in the Syrian crisis to exploit the Hazara refugees.

The government somehow force or coerce these refugees to get involved in the proxy war in Syria, in exchange for residence visas, education for their children, money, security for their families and avoiding deportation [33]. Iran even recruits Afghans below the age of 18 [33]. Ahmad Rashid, the journalist and author of a book on the Taliban, states [34] that *“Hazara Shia refugees in Iran are being recruited to fight for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and that makes them even more of a target for Sunni extremists in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.”*

Hazaras seeking asylum in Europe

According to the UNHCR spokesman Nadir Farhad, approximately 122,080 Afghans applied for asylum in 44 countries between January and August 2015, more than twice the number for 2014 [35,36]. In total, about 180,000 Afghans sought asylum protection for the first time in the EU member states in 2015. The majority of these Afghan asylum seekers entering Europe are Hazaras [38]. The ongoing violence in Afghanistan, targeted killings, and kidnappings of various ethnic groups are the biggest driving force for Afghans, especially Hazaras to risk their lives to reach EU and elsewhere. There are many reports that dozens of these refugees heading to Europe have been killed in Iran in the last few months, whilst thousands have been tortured and deported to Afghanistan [39-42]. We believe that any discussion on asylum seekers especially Hazaras need to be considered in light of the security situation and the threats that these people are facing from the twin terror groups of Taliban and ISIS. They are two sides of the same coin given their animosity towards the Hazaras. The government in Afghanistan blatantly declares the central and northern parts of Afghanistan safe and encourages asylum seekers and refugees to go back. It also deceives the concerned governments that harbor refugees and asylum seekers into believing that the country is indeed safe and it is fine to repatriate the refugees. Nothing is further from the truth as the events of the last 15 years have shown. There have been cases where the returnees are especially targeted by the terrorists.

Systematic discrimination against Hazaras

Previous Afghan regimes deliberately tried to deprive Hazarajat of economic development, keeping the region isolated from the rest of the country. Since the defeat of the Hazara uprising in 1891 until the communist government in 1977, heavy taxes were levied only on Hazaras. These included taxes on the number of people, on the number of animals as well as the tax on war ransom. On the other hand, non-Hazaras were not obliged to pay those taxes. This type of extreme economic pressure accompanied by social, cultural, economic and political discrimination and marginalization, forced millions of Hazaras to live below poverty line. In fact, in order to survive and pursue a better life, many Hazaras were pressured into denying their ethnic identities, thus giving up their religious beliefs and officially registering themselves as Tajik or Qezelbash [3,4]. This situation continued for decades and still exists in some parts.

In the post-2001 international intervention in Afghanistan, less attention has been given to the reconstruction of the Hazara regions. Despite the fact that these regions are much safer and securer and undeveloped in comparison to other parts of Afghanistan, the Afghan government and the international community have shown less interest in their reconstruction and progress. As a result, Hazaras are convinced that the central government has carried out discriminatory policies against them, as their share in the enjoyment of hundreds of millions of dollars of international community's aid has been very small in comparison to the rest of Afghanistan. The Hazaras believe, that perhaps, they are being punished due to their peaceful approach, democratic and civil manners and their alignment with the international community.

Since the fall of the Taliban, the international community, especially the USA, have supported the policy and notion of ‘whoever makes more trouble will benefit more’. Based on this policy, most of international’s aid and development projects had been dedicated to conflict zones, mostly in the south, southwest and eastern parts of Afghanistan. Despite this, the policies have not been effective with violence and the cultivation of poppies in the region on the rise [49,50]. Hundreds of millions of dollars that were dedicated to building roads, schools, hospitals were wasted as they had been destroyed by the insurgent groups. In addition, this policy leads to further corruption and exploitation by opportunistic security companies, who have collaborated with the Mafia and other insurgent groups to make a profit [51].

There are strong evidences that the Afghan government is pursuing policies and taking actions that discriminate against the Hazara people and encourage and facilitate systematic discrimination. While there are many examples of systematic discrimination against Hazaras by Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) and Ghani and his associates, the world Hazara Council (WHC) focuses on three specific examples in this report.

- 1) **Employment in Afghan government.** The Afghan Government and its affiliated institutions collectively are the largest employers in the country. According to unofficial statistics gathered by World Hazara Council on informal basis, while the Hazara comprise between 35 and 45 percent of the population of Kabul city and Hazara representatives occupy 40% of the seats in the Afghan parliament allocated to Kabul province, the percentage of Hazaras occupying Grade 3 and above jobs in government institutions in Kabul is less than 2%. More details can be found in the Appendix V of this brief. Noteworthy. This is even more outrageous since the number of graduated Hazaras from universities in the last 15 years are very significant in comparison to other ethnic groups. This gross injustice is partly due to historical institutional discrimination against the Hazara people, but also due to intentional systematic discrimination carried out by Afghan officials headed by Ghani in the current employment practices in Government. In fact, during the last two years the presence of Hazaras in government institutions have decreased and government officials and Ghani have intentionally marginalized and refused to hire highly qualified Hazara candidates.
- 2) **Social Services.** The Hazara have been the victims of institutional discrimination carried out by Afghan government in distribution of social services and development assistance. While tens of billions of dollars of international assistance have been invested by the international community in infrastructure and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, the Hazara populated regions of the country have been intentionally deprived of the benefit of these investments. The provinces where Hazaras live have remained underdeveloped and despite having great potential and geographic importance, no major development projects have been implemented in these regions. To this date, Hazara provinces have virtually no functioning airports (apart from a small airport in Bamyan), asphalt roads, power or any other infrastructure necessary for ordinary life or economic growth. Similarly, the Hazara have been victims of institutional discrimination in the areas of scholarships for study abroad and every other social benefit provided by Afghan government.
- 3) **Economic Development; 500kV Transmission Line:** Most of the recent demonstrations by Hazaras were triggered by GIROA’s discriminatory approach and position on a 500kV power transmission line from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan also known as the TUTAP Project. There is overwhelming evidence that Da Afghanistan Breshna Shirkat (DABS), the recipient of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) grant for the TUTAP project and the implementer of the project, has purposefully engaged in conduct in connection with the project that amounts to racial discrimination against the Hazara. Specifically, DABS has contracted to build the Project through the harsh mountainous Salang pass rather than through Bamyan-Wardak route as envisioned in

Afghanistan's Energy Master Plan and as recommended by Fichtner [52], the international energy consulting firm that prepared the Energy Master Plan and the bidding documents for the Project. The Bamyan-Wardak route was recommended because it created tremendous economic opportunities for Afghanistan in general and Central Afghanistan in particular, mostly Hazara populated regions, including facilitating and enabling the development of major national deposits in Central Afghanistan such as the Hajigak iron deposit, and the production of coal based power from multiple coal deposits along the Bamyan route. The decision of DABS is technically and economically counterintuitive, contrary to the economic interest of Afghanistan and ultimately significantly more expensive than the Bamyan-Wardak route envisioned in the Energy Master Plan. More details can be found in the Appendix III and Appendix IV of this brief. There is overwhelming and irrefutable evidence that the acts of DABS were motivated by racial discrimination against the Hazara people, who comprise most of the population of Central Afghanistan, with the specific intent to deny these people the economic opportunities that the project would have brought to them. The conduct of DABS and GIROA is not only irrational and contrary to the Energy Master Plan and the recommendation of Fichtner but also in violation of the Constitution (Articles 6, 7 and 22) and laws of Afghanistan, against the international laws and against the basic principles of equality and justice. Moreover, the development of many national projects in Hazara-dominated areas have been halted or postponed for almost a decade; the extraction of Hajigak mine in Bamyan province, Dara-I-Suf coal mine in Samangan province, and Kahmard-o-Saighan and Yakawlang coal-mine in Bamyan are prime examples. The development of these project is in the national interest of the country and all Afghans will benefit from them. In addition, the main roads that connect Hazarajat with the rest of the country, Like Heart-Ghor-Kabul and Bamyan-Dare-I-Suf highways, which were in National plan of the government in the last 40 years have never been constructed. Also there is no proper roads within the central Afghanistan to connect different provinces and districts of this region.

Conclusion

To conclude, the overall situation of the Hazaras in post-2015 Afghanistan and Pakistan remains vulnerable. Their democratic achievements in Afghanistan in the post-2001 period are at risk. With the rise of Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the increase of Taliban' activities across Afghanistan, the Afghan and international community achievement in security, human rights and democracy will be in great danger. Vulnerable groups like religious minorities and women will suffer the most. In particular, the Hazaras who suffered the most during the Taliban will be the main victim of mass killings and persecution. Given the Hazara community's overwhelming support for the international coalition and to the democratic process, the international community and the European governments must put in place measures to safeguard the human rights of the Hazara people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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Appendix I

The killing and kidnapping of Hazaras in 2015

1. On 24 February 2015, 31 Hazara passengers, when travelling from Iran to the Afghan capital, Kabul, through Zabul province, were seized. The kidnapers separated the Sunni Muslims from Shiite Muslims and then ordered the Shiite males - all ethnic Hazaras - off the buses^{1,2,3}.

After worldwide demonstrations, 19 of these hostages were released on 11 May 2015⁴. According to the local people and families of these victims, two of these hostages had died few days after their capture due to illness and two were later killed^{5,29}. Until now no one knows about the circumstance of 8 remaining hostages. Since the release of 19 hostages the public pressure on the Afghan government dramatically decreased and no proper action has taken place in order to rescue the remaining hostages. However, after the beheading of 7 Hazaras, including two women and a 9-years-old child, on 8 November 2015, five of these hostages with another 3 hostages, somehow, were released²⁹. Therefore, two of them are still missing.

2. On 16 March 2015, 10 Hazaras were kidnapped in Ghazni province; 9 of the hostages were released three hours after the incident⁶.
3. On 17 March 2015, 6 Hazaras were abducted by armed masked men on the Herat-Farah highway at Kanisk area of Farah province⁶.
4. On 25 March 2015, Taliban abducted 20 Hazaras-Baluch Shia in Kijran district of Daikondi provinces⁷. However, they were released on 28 March 2015⁸.
5. 30 March 2015, three Hazaras are kidnaped in Sholgara district of Balkh⁹.
6. 1 April 2015, 13 Hazaras are kidnapped in Sar-e Pul's Balkhab district. The Taliban released four of their hostages in early April and the remaining nine on 14 April 2015¹⁰.
7. On 14 April 2015, four Hazaras from Malestan district travelling to Ajrestan district were kidnapped and, soon after, killed¹¹.
8. On 8 June 2015, the Taliban kidnapped four Hazaras from Rasana in Gelan district of Ghazni province in Afghanistan. The hostages included two women and a child¹². However, on 8 November 2015, two women and a child, somehow, were released²⁹. The released people may be these hostages or it may belong to another unreported kidnapping.
9. On 16 June 2015, six Hazaras from Gharabagh district of Ghazni was kidnapped, 4 of them has released but the two are still missing¹³.
10. On 4 July 2015, 22 Hazara security forces, battling the Taliban about 30 miles west of Kabul, were killed while units of an Afghan police force headquartered nearby provided no support. What makes this incident very unique is that the Hazaras policemen did not received back up and enforcement during their 24 hours' combat although it was possible for local authorities and central agencies to provide the required help within hours. Arguably, the Jalriz incident shows the existence of the rifts in the ranks of the Afghan security forces around ethnic lines^{14,15}.
11. On 25 July 2015, 18 Hazaras, including women, were kidnapped in northern Baghlan province. According to Abdul Jabar Perdili, the provincial police chief, the gunmen stopped a

vehicle with 18 Shiite Hazaras in Dahna-i Ghor district. Amongst the kidnapped, four women and one man were released, whilst the authorities were still negotiating the release of the other hostages. There is no official report about their release^{16,17}.

12. On 9 August 2015, 3 Hazaras were kidnapped and four days later, on 12 August, their bodies were found in Nawur district of Ghazni province^{18,19}.
13. On 12 August 2015, unidentified assailants abducted 12 people belonging to the ethnic Hazara minority in Ghazni province. There is no news about their release so far^{20,21}.
14. On 5 September 2015, 13 Harazas in northern Afghanistan were killed while traveling in the Zari district in Balkh province. According to Jafar Haidari, district governor of Zari, the gunmen stopped two vehicles, lined up the male passengers- all Hazaras- and shot them^{22,23}.
15. On 20 September 2015, Sayed Habibullah Musawi, a 56-year-old Hazara who lived in Sydney, was captured by Taliban militants on 20 September as he travelled from Jaghori to Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan. However, three days later on 22 September his dead body was discovered with gunshots to his neck and chest²⁴.
16. On 8 November 2015, seven Hazaras, including two women and a nine-year-old child, were brutally beheaded by ISIS and Taliban groups in Southern Zabul province of Afghanistan^{25,26,27,28}. This has been one of the most inhumane and barbaric act carried by terrosits groups in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.
17. On 21 November, the unidentified gunmen stopped buses on the road between Qalat and Shahjoy distrits in Zabul province in southern Afghanistan and abducted 17 Hazara passengers. Later 9 of them were released but 8 of them are still in the hand of these terrorist group^{30,31,32}.

New statistics of Hazara community victims in Afghanistan which mainly happened in two last years;

18. Deh Mazang square: 90 martyrs and 320 wounded The Enlightenment Movement protesters. (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kabul-explosion-casualties-blast-targets-protest-march-suicide-attack-a7152216.html>)
19. Darul Aman Palace, Aladdin Crossroad Kabul, 28 martyrs and 40 wounded Tolo TV staff. (<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/08/inside-the-ruins-of-kabuls-darul-aman-palace-in-pictures/the-darul-aman-palace-in-kabul-afghanistan3/>)
20. Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan Hospital, 250 martyrs and 97 wounded. (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/afghanistan-kabul-terror-attack-latest-isis-gunmen-sardar-mohammad-daud-khan-military-hospital-us-a7617281.html>) and (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/gunmen-dressed-as-doctors-attack-military-hospital-in-kabul>) and (<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-blast/explosion-gunfire-reported-at-hospital-in-afghan-capital-kabul-idUKKBN16F0GF>)
21. Bagher al-ulum Mosque, Kabul, 36 martyrs and 60 wounded. (<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/shia-mosque-herat-province-hit-deadly-explosion-170801163417483.html>)
22. Karte Sakhi, 18 martyrs, 28 wounded. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37621502>)

23. Al-Zahra Mosque of Dasht-Barchi, Kabul, 12 martyrs and 18 wounded.
(<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kabul-explosion-mosque-shia-muslims-bomb-explosion-attack-claims-afghanistan-latest-updates-today-a7792391.html>) and
(<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/15/suicide-bomber-shia-mosque-kabul-afghanistan>)
24. Zanbaq Crossroad, 95 martyrs and 158 wounded.
(<https://de.sputniknews.com/amp/panorama/20180127319256002-kabul-anschlag-explosion/>)
25. Imam Zaman mosque, Najaara castle, 41 martyrs and 76 wounded.
(<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/25/afghanistan-deadly-attack-mosque-war-crime>) and
(<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/gunmen-attack-shia-imam-zaman-mosque-kabul-170825095421445.html>)
26. Mosque of Imam Zaman, Dasht-e- Barchi, Kabul, 38 martyrs and 59 wounded.
(<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/20/afghanistan-hit-suicide-bomb-attacks-mosques-leaving-63-dead/>) and (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/dozens-dead-in-mosque-blast-in-kabul-report-says/2017/10/20/6549f264-b5a1-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html)
27. Tabian Social and Cultural Centre, 43 wounded 93 martyrs.
(<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast/blast-at-afghan-news-agency-office-in-kabul-casualties-feared-idUSKBN1EM0F5>)
28. Mossalay-e- Baba Mazari, 18 martyrs and 18 wounded.
29. Near the Mossalay-e- Baba Mazari, behind of Asif e Mayil school, 65 martyrs and 140 wounded. (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/22/dozens-dead-in-kabul-bombing-at-voter-registration-centre-afghanistan>)
30. Mazar-e-Sharif, 16 martyrs and 21 wounded, during Shia mourning of Imam Hossain.
31. Tragedy of Mirza Olang, 50 martyrs of wounded 28 and 28 captives.
(<https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mass-graves-discovered-mirza-olang-following-massacre>) and (<https://unama.unmissions.org/unama-human-rights-report-mass-killings-mirza-olang>) and <https://www.mycase.com.au/page/157538/an-urgent-plea-to-help-the-survivors-of-mirza-olang-massacre>)
32. Tarinkot district of Urozgan Province, 10 martyrs and 15 wounded.
33. Ghazni, 30 martyrs and 55 wounded.
(<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/17/attack-afghan-police-training-centre-gardez-taliban>)
34. Ghor, 30 martyrs and 18 wounded.
35. Javadia Mosque of Herat 34 martyrs and 62 wounded.
(<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/afghanistan-mehr-als-20-tote-bei-anschlag-auf-schiitische-moschee-a-1160964.html>) and (<https://www.dw.com/de/anschlag-auf-moschee-in-herat/a-39926343>)

36. Afghanistan: dozens dead as Taliban attack Ghazni.
(<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/10/afghanistan-dozens-dead-as-taliban-attack-ghazni-officials-say>) and (<https://derstandard.at/2000085221814/Dutzende-Tote-bei-Gefechten-um-ostafghanische-Stadt-Ghazni>)
37. Forty-eight people have been killed and 67 injured in a bomb explosion at an education centre in Afghanistan's capital, Kabul. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45199904>) and (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/islamic-state-suicide-bombing-students-kabul-afghanistan-shia-a8495001.html>) and (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/islamic-state-claims-suicide-bombing-that-killed-scores-of-students-in-kabul/2018/08/16/8762d2c2-a145-11e8-93e3-24d1703d2a7a_story.html) and (<https://www.9news.com.au/2018/08/16/06/41/suicide-bomber-targets-shiite-students-in-kabul>) and (<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afghanistan-dutzende-sterben-bei-selbstmordanschlag-in-kabul-1.3954488>)
38. On September 5, 2018, two explosions inside and outside of Maiwand Wrestling Club in western Kabul killed 26 people including two journalists and injured more than 91 others. (<https://www.darivoa.com/a/possible-suicide-attack-in-a-sport-club-in-western-KabulAfghanistan/4558643.html>)
39. On November 3, 2018, Taliban onslaught on Hazara district of UrzganKhas in Uruzgan resulting in at least 21 Hazaras killed (including women and children), displaying nearly 700 families and 300 families under Taliban siege. (<https://www.etilaatroz.com/68506/etilaatroz-special-report-on-special-forces-urozgan-refugees/>) and (<https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/taleban-attacks-on-khas-uruzgan-jaghori-and-malestan-i-a-new-and-violent-push-into-hazara-areas/>) and (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-security/afghan-shiite-militia-battles-taliban-raising-sectarian-fears-idUSKCN1N80FC>) and (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1063463925298147328>)
40. On November 7, 2018, Taliban onslaught on Hazara districts of Jaghori, Malistan in Ghazni, resulted in killings of at least 51 Hazara civilians, wounding dozens, and displacing hundreds of Hazara families. (<https://www.etilaatroz.com/68983/security-situation-in-jaguri-and-malistan-is-good-displaced-people-return-to-their-homes/>) and (<https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/taleban-attacks-on-khas-uruzgan-jaghori-and-malestan-i-a-new-and-violent-push-into-hazara-areas/>) and (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1063465424673796098>)
41. On November 12, 2018, Taliban onslaught on Sangcharak Aabe Kalan in SarePul province resulted in displacement of 1500 Hazara families after district falls to Taliban. (<https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/11/18/1500-sar-i-pul-families-flee-fresh-violence-balkh>) and (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1069344395852464132>)
42. On November 12, 2018, ISKP suicide blast targeted Hazaras protesting Afghan Government inaction against massive Taliban attacks on several cities in provinces of Hazarajat (UruzganKhas, Uruzgan; Jaghori and Malistan in Ghazni) killing at least six Hazaras (including one Sunni Hazara) and wounding dozens. (https://twitter.com/Terror_Monitor/status/1062066133782663170) and (<https://twitter.com/TOLONews/status/1061826835632320512>) and (https://twitter.com/Terror_Monitor/status/1062347481395195910)
43. On November 25, 2018, Afghan Security Forces opened indiscriminate fire on Hazaras protesting arrest of Hazara leader, Ali Pur Shamsher, killing at least 4 and wounding 21. (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1067165072894697473>)

44. On November 19, 2018, Taliban stopped Hazara vehicle, executed three Hazara passengers near Firozkoh in Ghor province. (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1067176628185456640>)
45. On March 7, 2019, at least three killed and 22 wounded in multiple explosions targeting Hazaras marking 24th death anniversary of Abdul Ali Mazari. (<https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/kabul-gathering-comes-under-mortar-attack>)
46. On March 9, 2019, prominent Hazara businessman and political figure, Ali Juma Mohibi, gunned down in Jibreel, Herat. (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1109614344529170432>)
47. On March 21, 2019, three deadly blasts by ISKP targeted Nouruz (new year) celebration at Sakhi shrine near Kabul, killing at least six, wounding at least 23. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47651752>) and (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1109625343202201600>)
48. On April 10, 2019, Taliban kidnap two female passengers at gunpoint in Qarabagh, Ghazni. (<https://www.darivoa.com/a/unknown-gunmen-kidnapped-2-woman-in-ghazni-Provence/4869550.html>)
49. On May 2, 2019, Taliban stopped Hazara vehicle and executed three passengers. (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1124320186910289920>)
50. On May 10, 2019, Taliban and Kuchi attack on Kajab, Behsud in Maidan Wardak, killed at least 10 Hazaras, wounding 10 others. (<https://www.etilaatroz.com/77105/taliban-and-kuchies-attacks-on-behsud-district-of-maidan-wardak-casualties-left/>) and (<https://twitter.com/i/moments/1128749980813070339>)
51. On May 27, 2019, two Hazara security forces killed in Jalrez, Maidan Wardak. (<https://www.facebook.com/republicofsilence/photos/a.636098463075445/2417506918267915/>)
52. On June 1, 2019, Taliban attacked Hazara passengers in Jalrez, killing at least 3 and wounding 2. (<https://subhekabul.com/%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%8C-%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%BA%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87/>)
53. On June 2, 2019, ISKP blast targets student bus in Kabul, killing at least 2, wounding dozens. (<https://news.yahoo.com/three-blasts-hit-kabul-killing-one-injuring-17-073241290.html>)

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http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/11/151108_k05_taliban_killed_7_hazara_hostages
- 27) International Business time report on 9 November 2015 at: <http://www.ibtimes.co.in/afghanistan-taliban-executes-isis-militants-beheading-hazara-muslims-including-women-child-654063>
- 28) NBC News report on 9 November 2015 at <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-linked-fighters-behead-3-women-child-afghan-officials-n459711>
- 29) BBC report on 10 November 2015 at:
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/11/151110_k05_8_afghan_hostages_free
- 30) Wall street report on 21 November 2015 at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/gunmen-in-afghanistan-kidnap-group-of-hazaras-1448127673>
- 31) Aljazeera report on 21 November 2015 at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/gunmen-abduct-ethnic-hazara-southern-afghanistan-151121154925821.html>
- 32) BBC Persian News Service on 22 November 2015 at:
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/11/151122_k05_zabul_kidnapped_hazara

Appendix II

Global protest condemning targeted Hazara killing in Afghanistan

On 8 November 2015, seven Hazaras, including two women and a nine-year-old child, were brutally beheaded by ISIS and Taliban groups in the Southern Zabul province of Afghanistan. This is arguably one of the most inhumane and barbaric acts carried by terrorist groups in the country since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The unimaginable beheading of 9-years-old Shukria was very horrific and shocking¹.

Since January 2015, more than 150 Hazaras, including four women and two kids, have been abducted by terrorist groups like the Taliban and ISIS on the highway across different parts of Afghanistan. These are the incidents that reported by domestic and international media organisations; however, there are still many unreported incidents across the country. Until now, 33 of the reported hostages have been brutally killed, including two women and a 9-year-old child. Unfortunately, 43 hostages are still missing, including two women and a child.

With the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan, continued Taliban insurgency operations in Afghanistan, the gradual withdrawal of international forces from the country and lack of effective policies from the current Unity Government of Afghanistan, the security situation is very critical within the country.

An increase in violence and instability will mostly affect vulnerable minority groups and women. The Hazaras in particular, who have suffered the most during the Taliban regime, will be the main victim. Whilst the country is dominated by Sunni Muslims, the vast majority of Hazaras are Shiite Muslims. According to extremist groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS, the Hazara Shias are infidels. Despite some Hazaras being Sunni, and whilst many more have converted due to prosecution, these extremist groups do not accept them as Muslims. In light of this, the Hazaras are continuously targeted, kidnapped, killed and used as bargaining political tools for negotiations with the government.

The recent kidnappings and target killings, due to ethnic and religious affiliations, indicates a serious threat not only for Hazaras but for all Afghans. Despite these reoccurring events, the Hazaras' demand for security has not been heard or met by the Afghan government. The recent incident clearly indicates that the government is not doing enough to safeguard and protect the basic human rights of Afghan citizens.

In solidarity with civil and peaceful movements across the globe and expressing our sincere condolences to the affected families, the World Hazara Council (WHC) demands the following from the international community, in particular the USA and the European countries:

- 1) The international community must take coherent action against the continuing threat of hostage-taking and target killing of the Hazaras, whilst assisting the Afghan government and the people of Afghanistan to help stop these incidents, which ultimately seeks to spread sectarian, ethnic, and religious conflict within the country.
- 2) The international community must put the necessary pressure on the Afghan government to do its best in identifying and bringing into justice those responsible for these crimes against humanity.

- 3) The WHC urges the Afghan government to provide extensive and coherent security measures to Hazara populated areas and those highways leading to Hazara-dominated lands by creating a force at the army corps capacity in the framework of the ministry of defence. This would decrease and prevent the killing of innocent Afghan citizens by insurgency groups. In addition, such measures will hinder local citizens deciding to arm themselves, which will inevitably question the authority and legitimacy of the current government.
- 4) We acknowledge and appreciate the efforts made by the European countries and hope that they continue assisting and supporting Afghan migrants, who are seeking asylum in Europe. In light of recent incidents and instability within the country, Afghans have no choice but to seek refuge in other countries where they should be granted leave to remain in Europe.

¹ After World wide protest the UN (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52521#.Vl4sgYRlmCR>), USA (<http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pr-111015.html>) and European parliament (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20151120IPR03620/html/Human-rights-Bangladesh-Afghanistan-Cambodia>) publicly condemned the Hazara killings.

Appendix III

The TUTAP Electricity Line: Arguments and Positions

In 2013, Fichtner, a leading German engineering and consultancy company, was tasked by the Afghan Government to identify the priorities, timeframe, and costs associated with Afghanistan power sector development goals. The Assessment was funded by Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction.

Key Recommendation of the Report

Use the Bamyan route for a new transmission line on 500 kV level. For which, it provided the following reasons:

- It will avoid the narrow space and difficulties along the Salang pass
- Connect further generation by coal fired power plants along the route, both Aynak and Hajigag mines could benefit from this coal energy
- Secure power supply to Kabul and South Afghanistan by using a separate route.

Fichtner argued that although Salang pass may have “the advantage of slightly shorter time for construction and will have slightly less investment costs”; however, the route has “significant disadvantages”¹. These disadvantages are:

- The network integration of the coal fired power plants along the Bamyan route and the power supply of Bamyan region will require an additional transmission line and the additional investment will be significantly high, adding to the total investment.
- Salang pass will also be the route for the HVDC line for CASA-1000 project, as the actual planning of CASA-1000 indicates and the construction of a third line along the Salang Pass will be very difficult, if not impossible.
- Routing all lines to Kabul on one corridor will increase the risk of losing the whole of supply for Kabul region due to one single event.

The Arguments/Position of Leadership of NUG and Brishna Company

- Refers to second Fichtner report arguing that the Salang Pass would cost less and take less time.
- Donors would not pay additional fund for the Bamyan route and we cannot wait that long. At this stage, the Bamyan pass would delay the power supply to the South by two years.
- The decision was taken by the previous government. Some of those advocating against the Salang Pass were present in the former cabinet and they have been aware of the decision-making process. Why didn't they raise their concerns then?
- “Do you want electricity or electricity poles?” has been the latest argument from the Government. It promises to build a separate electricity line from Parwan province to Bamyan to address the electricity needs of the population.

Response from Demonstrators and Bamyan Route Activists

- The Government's decision to choose Salang over Bamyan goes against the recommendation of 2013 Fichtner report.
- This has raised many questions about the government's decision-making process and transparency over the decision. Demonstrators argue that they see this as a deliberate attempt by the Government to discriminate and bypass the development

of Central Afghanistan, as this has been the case throughout history. This is unjust, corrupt and undermines Afghanistan's interests.

- Although, the Bamyan route would cost up to 35 million USD more and might take longer, the delay could be justified. The ADB's procurement policy and international FIDIC procurement policy on which ADB adheres to, does allow the option of an Alternative Bid, Repeat Order, or Clarification of Alternation of Bids, which would allow us to proceed with the winning companies and ask them to provide a new proposal for the Bamyan-Wardak route. The winning companies could implement the project not from two directions/places but from four. More importantly, the timing and cost argument cannot be justified as many other projects have been delayed with donor funding still guaranteed. An example of one such project is the national electronic ID card. Demonstrators argue that delay can further be justified as the Bamyan route would benefit a key vulnerable region of the country.
- Indeed, the previous cabinet approved the TUTAP project in 2013. However, the *project route* was NEVER discussed in any cabinet meetings. Sarwar Danesh, the Second Vice-President argues that he was led to understand that the TUTAP project route will be Bamyan.
- Breshna's decision-making process is a clear violation of Afghanistan's national interests and it must be considered corruption. The Dar-e-Suf and Eshposhta coal mines could help increase domestic electricity production and reduce our dependencies on foreign imports. The Bamyan route will enable us to cheaply extract Hajigag and Aynak copper as suggested by the Fichtner report.
- Demonstrators argue that their demand should not be limited to "wanting electricity" but that justice prevails. They argue that the Central Highland provinces have been without power for centuries, waiting a few more years is not an issue. They strongly condemn injustice and discriminations.
- Demonstrators believe that they are actually defending the national interest of the country as the Bamyan route will bring clear long-term development and benefits for Afghanistan. The line will generate jobs and ensures the development of the deprived and poor people of Bamyan in the medium to long-run. We want just development.

The Demand and Position of the key Stakeholders asking for the Implementation of Fichtner Report and the Bamyan Route

- Ask the Leaders of NUG to respect the independent and technical recommendation of Fichtner on TUTAP which clearly recommends the Bamyan route as the best option for long-term economic and security interests of the country.
- Ask the leaders of NUG to be transparent and accountable to all Afghans in pursuit of just and equal distribution of development resources for all Afghans including those who are vulnerable.
- Bring to justice those corrupt officials who have tried to undermine the national interest of the country by manipulating the decision-making process of TUTAP.
- We ask the international community including foreign donors and human right groups to hear and reflect the democratic demands of the people and pressure the head of NUG to respect the just demands of the people.
- Strongly condemn intimidation and threat by elements within the NUG and their propaganda tactics which has tried to limit our demands to "getting electricity". We want above and beyond anything else an Afghanistan without discrimination and prejudice.

- We stand firmly for our demands and will use every single democratic tool to ensure justice is achieved including demonstration, non-cooperation with the NUG, withdrawing representatives from the government, and closing government offices.

¹ Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan, (April 2013, Final Report , FITCHER)

Appendix IV

World-wide protest Statement against injustice and unbalanced development in Afghanistan

Social justice, equality among all ethnic groups and balanced development has been considered as a principle in the sixth article of the Afghan constitution. In the past 15 years, the Afghan Government has violated this important principle on numerous occasions by discriminating a specific group of people because of their ethnicity and religious beliefs.

The recent violation of the Afghan constitution is the Afghan government controversial decision about 500kV transmission power line known as TUTAP project (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan). The Afghan government insists on implementing this line through the Salang region, while Fichtner Group, an internationally recognized engineering and consulting company developed Afghanistan's energy master plan, concluded that this line should be implemented through the Bamyan province as it is the best and safest route for this project. Furthermore, the report emphasizes that by passing through Bamiyan and a number of other provinces, this line will supply energy to these underdeveloped regions and lead to development of many major national projects located in the central Afghanistan. The development of these projects, including the Hajigak mine, is in the national interest of the country and all Afghans will benefit from them.

The central of Afghanistan is mainly populated by Hazaras, an ethnic group comprise 20 to 25 percent of the total Afghan population and historically persecuted on double ethnic and religious grounds. Still overall situation of the Hazaras in post-2015 Afghanistan and Pakistan remains vulnerable. With the withdrawal of the international peace-keeping troops and the expanding activities of different terrorist groups such as Taliban and ISIS throughout the entire country, Hazaras are now subjected to violence and danger because of their ethnicity and religious beliefs. They have also been subject to violence, kidnapping, target killings and mass killings in the past several years and specifically during the Taliban era. The appearance of the terrorist group ISIS in the recent years and their hatred against Shia Muslims is also a great concern for Hazaras as majority of them follow the Shia version of Islam.

In addition to major security threats, Hazaras are also faced with systematic discrimination from the central government. Considering their population, they are less represented in the government and their representation is often symbolic, meaning they do not have real power and cannot make decisions. The provinces where Hazaras live have remained underdeveloped and despite having a great potential and geographic importance, no major development projects have been implemented in these regions. The process of the extraction of two major coal mines, Yakawland and Dare-Suf has been postponed in several occasions by the central government mainly because they are located in the places where Hazaras live. The construction of the Herat-Kabul highway, via Ghor province, has also been avoided by the government.

This happens while Hazaras have played an important role in the democratic process in the country, have fought against terrorism and drugs after the removal of the Taliban regime. By establishing social and civil rights movements, peaceful coexistence with other ethnic groups and taking distance

from violence, they have practically shown that they want a better future for themselves and for the next generations in the country. It is also important to notice that despite numerous difficulties and obstacles, the young generation of Hazara people has been eagerly pursuing education during the past 15 years.

The current decision of the government on 500kV transmission power line clearly indicates the policy of removal and deprivation of Hazarajat from any national master plans for major projects. On the other hand, the government's decision has sparked demonstration across Afghanistan and outside of the country. Afghan citizens from all ethnic group, including influential leaders, human rights activists, members of parliament, government officials, including both the Vices President and Chief Executive have voiced their concern about this controversial and discriminating decision, but the Afghan government has not given a proper response yet

In protest to this decision, which is against the suggestion of experts and violation of article 6 of the Afghan constitution, we have gathered here to ask the international organizations, the countries who financially support the Afghan government, especially the United States of America, Japan, the UK, Germany, France and Canada, and all other involved institutions the following:

1. We ask you to put pressure on the corrupt Afghan government in every possible way to respect the constitution and the principle of equality among all the citizens. The Afghan government should give a positive response to the request of Afghan citizens regarding the TUTAP project to pass through Bamiyan, as recommended by international experts.
2. We ask you to put pressure on the Afghan government to end its discriminatory policies towards the central regions and start working on national development projects in this region. The Afghan government must stop its ethnic-centred policies and not let further ethnic divisions. Otherwise, this will likely prompt even more Afghans to flee the country and seek asylum in Western Countries.
3. We ask you to not allow the Afghan government to spend the money you give on unsustainable and injustice development projects. The projects that do not eliminate poverty and discriminate the rights of Afghan citizens instead, are in favour of specific individuals, the Mafia groups and certain monopolistic companies.
4. We ask you to reconsider and revise your policies in Afghanistan, especially the policy that 'whoever makes more trouble will benefit more'. We urge you to not allow further discrimination against people Hazaras due to their peaceful approach, democratic and civil manners and their alignment with the international community.
5. We also strongly condemn the brutal action of Afghanistan's president Ashraf Ghani's bodyguards beating up the Afghan political activists at the Royal United Service Institute in London UK. This happened during Ashraf Ghani speech when the peaceful protesters just raised question about corruption and discrimination policy against Hazaras in Afghanistan.

Today's demonstrators consist of a small portion of Afghan citizens living in Afghanistan and abroad, who are tired of corruption, inefficiency and discrimination and made a firm decision for massive civil protest across the globe¹. While we want the international community and human rights organizations to support our our civil demands, we warn the Afghan government and their international supporters that we will continue our protest worldwide until our demands are heard. Furthermore, the Afghan community residing in Europe will launch massive protests prior and during the Brussels summit, which is going to take place in October 2016. The expansion of these demonstrations, may have severe consequences for the survival of the current Unity Government of Afghanistan. In that case, the responsibility for the crisis will fall onto the leaders of the Afghan National Unity Government and its international supporters.

¹EuroNews (16 May 2016), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-awGDmfcGmg>; Guardian (16 May 2016) “Hazara people march on Kabul in power line protest” ; Mujib Mashal (16 May 2016, The New York Times) Huge Protest Against Afghan Government Brings Kabul to a Halt

Appendix V

Percentage of Hazaras in Select Afghan Institutions¹

NO	MINISTRY	TOTAL EMPLOYEES	TOTAL HAZARA EMPLOYEES	HAZARAS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYEES	COMMENTS
1	Ministry of Justice	160	9	5.6%	Grade 3 and above.
2	Ministry of Rural Development	293	14	4.8%	Grade 3 and above.
3	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HQ)	214	8	3.7%	Grade 3 and above.
4	Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Tourism	334	11	3.3%	Grade 3 and above.
5	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Diplomatic Missions)	64	2	3.1%	Heads of mission only.
6	Ministry of Education	442	12	2.7%	Grade 3 and above.
7	Ministry of Counter Narcotics	40	1	2.5%	Grade 3 and above.
8	Ministry of Energy and Water	486	12	2.5%	Grade 3 and above.
9	Ministry of Public Works	168	4	2.4%	Grade 3 and above.
10	Ministry of Higher Education	271	6	2.2%	Grade 3 and above.
11	Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs	147	3	2.0%	Grade 3 and above.
12	National Security Council	367	7	1.9%	Total NSC staff.
13	Ministry of Martyrs, Disabled, Labor & Social Affairs	53	1	1.9%	Department heads only.
14	National Academy of Science	55	1	1.8%	Grade 3 and above.
15	Civil Service Reform Commission	113	2	1.8%	Grade 3 and above.
16	Ministry of Refugee Affairs	69	1	1.4%	Grade 3 and above.
17	Ministry of Finance	379	5	1.3%	Grade 3 and above.
18	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum	240	3	1.3%	Grade 3 and above.
19	Ministry of Health	176	1	0.6%	Grade 3 and above.
20	Office of the Attorney General	2180	9	0.4%	Professional staff in Kabul.
21	Environmental Protection Agency	58	0	0.0%	Grade 3 and above.
22	Civil Service Commission	113	2	1.8%	Grade 3 and above.
	Total	6309	110	1.8%	

¹This is an UNOFFICIAL STATISTICS Gathered by Civil Society in Kabul, Afghanistan.